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refactor(crypto): change hash_to_point algorithm (BFT-404) #80

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merged 4 commits into from
Apr 9, 2024

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moshababo
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@moshababo moshababo commented Mar 24, 2024

What ❔

Changing the existing hash_to_point algorithm to the standard try-and-increment algorithm:

  • hash msg into 32 uniform random bytes
  • reduce the 32 bytes to base field element for the x coordinate
  • try to get the y coordinate by computing the square root of x^3 + b
  • if failed, iterate again with x + 1

Why ❔

The existing hash to curve algorithm, which turns 32 bytes to G1::compressed and maps it into G1::uncompressed isn’t valid; it doesn’t produce a point with an unknown discrete log.

Notes

  • The function changed to return the successful nonce, in addition to the point. It’s currently unused, but suppose to be used for onchain verification, so that it won't require a loop. From the benchmarks I've run, the avg number of iteration is around 2. (nonce=1)
  • Need to review the crypto security of this approach, along with the expected onchain gas usage, mainly for the square root. I already prepared a compatible Solidity implementation, but I haven’t checked gas yet.
  • Need to review whether 32 uniform random bytes, to be reduced to x, are sufficient, or that it should be extended to 64 bytes, given the onchain verification gas usage implications.
  • Need to review whether just picking [only] the positive square root is good enough.
  • The prime field modulus (0x30644e72e131a029b85045b68181585d97816a916871ca8d3c208c16d87cfd47 / 21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297823662689037894645226208583) is defined in the base field type macro definition, but I found no way to access it, hence it is currently redefined in the implementation. This should be fixed.
  • get_point_from_x is already implemented for G1Affine, but it's private and unaccessible. This should be fixed.

.finalize()
.into();
pub(crate) fn hash_to_point(msg: &[u8]) -> (G1Affine, u8) {
let hash: [u8; 32] = sha3::Keccak256::new().chain_update(msg).finalize().into();
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64 bytes by IETF suggestion, or please cite the literature why non-uniform field element for X doesn't affect a protocol

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@brunoffranca brunoffranca Mar 25, 2024

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Why do we need 64 bytes? Maybe I'm misunderstanding something, but the prime field modulus is just 254 bits long. Generating a 64 bytes hash just seems pointless.

}

// It should be statistically infeasible to finish the loop without finding a point.
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Same way, please cite the literature. Even though we know the numbers of group elements, I do not remember any estimates on the distance between X coordinates

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AFAIU it’s about being quadratic residue, so distribution is about 50%. I’ll need some help in verifying that, and with finding the appropriate reference to literature.

x3b.mul_assign(&x);
x3b.add_assign(&fq::B_COEFF);
// Try find the square root.
x3b.sqrt().map(|y| G1Affine::from_xy_unchecked(x, y))
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Both +y and -y will give you a point on curve and in the correct subgroup. So you should pick and fix an ambiguity here, by e.g. picking one that is smaller as an integer

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I refrained from that because it adds extra steps and so gas usage in the onchain verification.
Doesn't sqrt() always returns +, and so doing nothing with negation means we're picking it over -? (assuming there's no benefit in picking the smaller-as-integer value)

node/libs/crypto/src/bn254/mod.rs Show resolved Hide resolved
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Looks good to me. But let's wait for @shamatar's approval of course.

@moshababo moshababo requested a review from pompon0 as a code owner April 9, 2024 14:13
@brunoffranca brunoffranca merged commit b77d70c into main Apr 9, 2024
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@brunoffranca brunoffranca deleted the hash_to_point branch April 9, 2024 20:38
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3 participants