-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 7
Commit
This commit does not belong to any branch on this repository, and may belong to a fork outside of the repository.
Fixes #162
- Loading branch information
Showing
3 changed files
with
90 additions
and
0 deletions.
There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ | ||
| # Rate Provider: `ERC4626RateProvider` | ||
|
|
||
| ## Details | ||
| - Reviewed by: @mkflow27 | ||
| - Checked by: @danielmkm | ||
| - Deployed at: | ||
| - [arbitrum:0x4d494eF5CB1143991F7F767567aD7f55bCfDc279](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x4d494eF5CB1143991F7F767567aD7f55bCfDc279#code) | ||
| - Audit report(s): | ||
| - [USDL audits](https://github.com/paxosglobal/ybs-contract/blob/master/audits/REP-final-20240301T145234Z.pdf) | ||
|
|
||
| ## Context | ||
| USDL is a yield-bearing stablecoin that safely distributes yield generated by its cash and cash equivalent reserve assets. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Review Checklist: Bare Minimum Compatibility | ||
| Each of the items below represents an absolute requirement for the Rate Provider. If any of these is unchecked, the Rate Provider is unfit to use. | ||
|
|
||
| - [x] Implements the [`IRateProvider`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-v2-monorepo/blob/bc3b3fee6e13e01d2efe610ed8118fdb74dfc1f2/pkg/interfaces/contracts/pool-utils/IRateProvider.sol) interface. | ||
| - [x] `getRate` returns an 18-decimal fixed point number (i.e., 1 == 1e18) regardless of underlying token decimals. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Review Checklist: Common Findings | ||
| Each of the items below represents a common red flag found in Rate Provider contracts. | ||
|
|
||
| If none of these is checked, then this might be a pretty great Rate Provider! If any of these is checked, we must thoroughly elaborate on the conditions that lead to the potential issue. Decision points are not binary; a Rate Provider can be safe despite these boxes being checked. A check simply indicates that thorough vetting is required in a specific area, and this vetting should be used to inform a holistic analysis of the Rate Provider. | ||
|
|
||
| ### Administrative Privileges | ||
| - [ ] The Rate Provider is upgradeable (e.g., via a proxy architecture or an `onlyOwner` function that updates the price source address). | ||
|
|
||
| - [x] Some other portion of the price pipeline is upgradeable (e.g., the token itself, an oracle, or some piece of a larger system that tracks the price). | ||
| - upgradeable component: `wYBSV1` ([arbitrum:0x7751E2F4b8ae93EF6B79d86419d42FE3295A4559](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7751E2F4b8ae93EF6B79d86419d42FE3295A4559#readProxyContract)) | ||
| - admin address: [arbitrum:0x501aDc5DfBf329175F9C8f036B523cc720d0F9e5](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x501aDc5DfBf329175F9C8f036B523cc720d0F9e5#code) | ||
| - admin type: multisig | ||
| - multisig threshold/signers: 3/20 | ||
|
|
||
| - upgradeable component: `YBSV1` ([arbitrum:0x7F850b0aB1988Dd17B69aC564c1E2857949e4dEe](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7F850b0aB1988Dd17B69aC564c1E2857949e4dEe#code)) | ||
| - admin address: [arbitrum:0x0E5087e19EB58e28DDF9F341b550BE6797547BF7](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0E5087e19EB58e28DDF9F341b550BE6797547BF7#code) | ||
| - admin type: multisig | ||
| - multisig threshold/signers: 3/17 | ||
|
|
||
|
|
||
| ### Oracles | ||
| - [ ] Price data is provided by an off-chain source (e.g., a Chainlink oracle, a multisig, or a network of nodes). | ||
|
|
||
| - [ ] Price data is expected to be volatile (e.g., because it represents an open market price instead of a (mostly) monotonically increasing price). | ||
|
|
||
| ### Common Manipulation Vectors | ||
| - [x] The Rate Provider is susceptible to donation attacks. | ||
|
|
||
| The rate providers rate calculation approach is based on dividing totalAssets over totalSupply. With a donation `totalAssets()` can be influenced. The implementation is based on reading the `balanceOf` as can be seen in the below implementation code snippet | ||
| ```solidity | ||
| /** @dev See {IERC4626-totalAssets}. */ | ||
| function totalAssets() public view virtual override returns (uint256) { | ||
| return _asset.balanceOf(address(this)); | ||
| } | ||
| ``` | ||
|
|
||
| ## Additional Findings | ||
| To save time, we do not bother pointing out low-severity/informational issues or gas optimizations (unless the gas usage is particularly egregious). Instead, we focus only on high- and medium-severity findings which materially impact the contract's functionality and could harm users. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Conclusion | ||
| **Summary judgment: SAFE** | ||
|
|
||
| This rate provider should work well with Balancer pools. The upgradeability mechanism is properly guarded behind a multisig and the rate approach follows one of the industry standards. |