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dji_imah_fwsig.py
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dji_imah_fwsig.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
""" DJI Firmware IMaH Un-signer and Decryptor tool.
Allows to decrypt and un-sign module from `.sig` file which starts with
`IM*H`. Use this tool after untarring single modules from a firmware package,
to decrypt its content.
"""
# Copyright (C) 2017 Freek van Tienen <[email protected]>
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
from __future__ import print_function
__version__ = "0.3.1"
__author__ = "Freek van Tienen, Jan Dumon, Mefistotelis @ Original Gangsters"
__license__ = "GPL"
import sys
import re
import os
import argparse
import binascii
import configparser
import itertools
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util import Counter
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
from Crypto.Signature import PKCS1_v1_5
from Crypto.Signature import pss
from ctypes import *
from collections import OrderedDict
from time import gmtime, strftime, strptime
from calendar import timegm
from copy import copy
from os.path import basename
# All found keys
keys = {
# Encryption keys
"RREK-2017-01": bytes([ # RR Encryption Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
# This key is used for protecting storage of development keys, it typically encrypts a container
# with plaintext RIEK key inside.
# used for: WM330 FW V00.01.0000-V01.02.0499, WM220 FW V00.01.0000-V01.03.0600
0x37, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x13, 0xE5, 0xD0, 0x80, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0x15, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1E, 0x16, 0xE7
]),
"RIEK-2017-01": bytes([ # R&D Image Encryption Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
# This key is used on many platforms, for pre-production development and engineering images;
# it is used as pre-production version of IAEK key
# used for: WM330 FW V00.01.0000-V01.02.0499, WM220 FW V00.01.0000-V01.03.0600
0xF1, 0x69, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x8B, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0xDC, 0x65, 0xEE, 0x0C, 0x57, 0x83, 0x32, 0x94, 0xE9
]),
"IAEK": bytes([ # Inner Image encryption key; published 2022-11-29 by M4xw & adinbied
# This key is used on WM330/WM220's inner image encryption (normal.img of m0801 f.e.)
# and is referenced on some other platforms
0x89, 0x9D, 0x1B, 0x90, 0xB1, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x92, 0xB6, 0x0D, 0xC1, 0xE1, 0x1A, 0xD4, 0x79, 0xA0
]),
"RUEK": bytes([ # RU Encryption Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
0x9C, 0xDA, 0xF6, 0x27, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0x78, 0xF3, 0xED, 0xDC, 0xE5, 0x26, 0xBC, 0xEC, 0x66, 0xF8
]),
"DRAK": bytes([ # DR Auth Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
0x6f, 0x70, 0x7f, 0x29, 0x62, 0x35, 0x1d, 0x75, 0xbc, 0x08, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0x19, 0xfa
]),
"SAAK": bytes([ # SDR_Auth Auth Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
0x6f, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xb8, 0x62, 0x52, 0x05, 0xce, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x58, 0x02, 0x17, 0xd2, 0x18, 0xd8
]),
# There are multiple PUEK keys, as DJI tried changing them as soon as they are published,
# without fixing vulnerabilities which allowed to read them
"PUEK-2017-07": bytes([ # Programming Update Enc Key whitebox AES v1; published 2017-10-25 by Freek van Tienen
# first use on 2017-07-28; used for: WM335 FW V01.00.1000-V01.00.5200,
# WM220 FW V01.04.0000-V01.04.0500, PM420 FW V01.01.0450-V01.01.0590,
0x63, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x83, 0x26, 0x7e, 0xee, 0xc0, 0x3f, 0x33, 0x30, 0xad, 0xb2, 0x38, 0xdd, 0x6b
]),
"PUEK-2017-01": bytes([ # Programming Update Enc Key Old Non-whitebox v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
# used for: WM330 FW V00.01.0000-V01.02.0499, WM220 FW V00.01.0000-V01.03.0600
0x70, 0xe0, 0x03, 0x08, 0xe0, 0x4b, 0x0a, 0xe2, 0xce, 0x8e, 0x07, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0x21, 0x4b, 0xb6
]),
"TRIE-2021-06": bytes([ # TR Image Encryption key; published 2021-08-26 by OGs
# first use on 2021-06-15; used for: WM1605 FW
0xcb, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x12, 0x71, 0x03, 0x88, 0x34, 0xec, 0x0c, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x2b, 0x69, 0x9d, 0xc2
]),
"TRIE-2019-11": bytes([ # TR Image Encryption key; published 2021-03-26 by Felix Domke
# first use on 2019-11-07; used for: WM160 FW, WM161 FW
0xf1, 0xe6, 0x30, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x84, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0xd5, 0x59, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x73, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x26
]),
"TKIE-2021-06": bytes([ # Trusted Kernel Image Encryption key; published 2021-08-26 by OGs
# This key is used for images within m0100 module which store kernel and device tree
# first use on 2021-06-15; used for: WM1605 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0000,
0xf8, 0xb4, 0x3c, 0x6b, 0x0d, 0xcd, 0x3f, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xfc, 0x08, 0xd4, 0xdd, 0xea, 0xf3, 0x58
]),
"TKIE-2019-11": bytes([ # Trusted Kernel Image Encryption key; published 2021-03-26 by Felix Domke
# This key is used for images within m0100 module which store kernel and device tree
# first use on 2019-11-07; used for:
# WM160 FW V01.00.0200-V01.00.0500, WM161 FW V01.00.0000-V01.02.0300
0xb6, 0x28, 0x6a, 0x05, 0xfc, 0x3a, 0x02, 0xf0, 0x36, 0x51, 0x11, 0xf0, 0x20, 0x45, 0x03, 0xa3
]),
"TBIE-2021-06": bytes([ # Trusted Boot Image Encryption key; published 2021-06-25 by OGs
# first use on 2021-06-15; used for: WM1605 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0000,
0x06, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0x70, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x49, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0xda, 0xde, 0xdf, 0x56, 0xa1
]),
"TBIE-2020-04": bytes([ # Trusted Boot Image Encryption key; published 2021-06-25 by OGs
# first use on 2020-04-23; used for:
# RCS231 FW V01.00.0108-V02.00.1200,
# RC-N1-WM161B FW V04.11.0016,
# RCJS170 FW V01.01.0000,
# RCSS170 FW V01.01.0000,
0x48, 0xd6, 0xe8, 0xff, 0x1b, 0x7f, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x99, 0xc2, 0x7e, 0x5a, 0xd7, 0x0d
]),
"TBIE-2019-11": bytes([ # Trusted Boot Image Encryption key; published 2021-03-26 by Felix Domke
# first use on 2019-11-07; used for:
# WM160 FW V01.00.0200-V01.00.0500, WM161 FW V01.00.0000-V01.02.0300
0x54, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xd7, 0x4c, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x46, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x3d, 0x16, 0xcc, 0x6f, 0x47
]),
"TBIE-2018-07": bytes([ # Trusted Boot Image Encryption key; published 2021-06-23 by fpv.wtf team
# first use on 2018-07-13; used for:
# WM240 FW V00.06.0000-V01.00.0670,
# WM245 FW V01.01.0000-V01.01.0800,
# WM246 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0800,
# GL150 FW V01.00.0600, LT150 FW V01.00.0600,
0xff, 0x94, 0x76, 0xf7, 0x8a, 0x89, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x9b, 0x6a, 0x90, 0x55, 0x64, 0x13, 0xb9, 0xc3
]),
"UFIE-2021-06": bytes([ # Update Firmware Image Encryption key; published 2021-08-26 by OGs
# first use on 2021-06-15; used for: WM1605 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0000,
0x84, 0x63, 0xf7, 0xb1, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xa3, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0x7b, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0xe2
]),
"UFIE-2020-04": bytes([ # UFI Encryption key; published 2021-06-20 by OGs
# first use on 2020-04-24; used for:
# WM170 FW V00.04.1009-V01.01.0000,
# GL170 FW V01.01.0000,
# WM231 FW V01.00.0113-V09.09.0902,
# WM232 FW V02.04.1640,
# PM430 FW, AG500 FW
# WM260 FW V01.00.0600
0xba, 0xb3, 0xcd, 0x72, 0x36, 0xb2, 0xe1, 0xd8, 0x66, 0x49, 0x35, 0xc9, 0xc2, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x3c
]),
"UFIE-2019-11": bytes([ # Update Firmware Image Encryption key; published 2021-03-26 by Felix Domke
# first use on 2019-11-07; used for:
# WM160 FW V01.00.0200-V01.00.0500, WM161 FW V01.00.0000-V01.02.0300
0xad, 0x45, 0xcd, 0x82, 0x13, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x25, 0x5d, 0xbe, 0x45, 0x41, 0x70, 0xbc, 0x11, 0xa0
]),
"UFIE-2018-07": bytes([ # Update Firmware Image Encryption key; published 2021-06-20 by OGs
# first use on 2018-07-13; used for:
# WM240 FW V00.06.0000-V01.00.0670, RC240 FW V01.00.0640, WM241 FW,
# WM150 FW V01.01.0000, GL150 FW V01.00.0600, LT150 FW,
0x78, 0x09, 0x39, 0xe1, 0xbe, 0x11, 0x7a, 0x66, 0xd3, 0x58, 0x41, 0xe9, 0x5b, 0x06, 0xaa, 0xc0
]),
"UFIE-2018-01": bytes([ # Update Firmware Image Encryption key; published 2021-06-19 by OGs
# first use on 2018-01-26; used for: WM230 FW V00.02.0026-V01.00.0500,
# RC230 FW V01.00.0000-V01.00.0200,
0xcd, 0x3a, 0xa5, 0x72, 0x2a, 0x41, 0x0b, 0x6d, 0xba, 0x3d, 0xaf, 0x2e, 0x99, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0x6d
]),
"SLEK": bytes([ # Slack community Encryption Key; generated 2018-01-19 by Jan Dumon
0x56, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x0E, 0xEE, 0x0F, 0x38, 0x05, 0x20, 0xE0, 0xBE, 0x70, 0xF2, 0x77, 0xD9, 0x0B
]),
# RSA authentication keys
"PRAK-2018-01": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v8; published 2021-09-30 by Mefistotelis
# first use on 2021-02-03; used for:
# RCS231 FW V01.00.0000
# RC-N1-WM161b FW V01.00.0000
# RCJS170 FW V01.00.0000
# RCSS170 FW V01.00.0000
"400000008f73897091b44b1eeef365bc3b7bcca12798f87d0c1523cdca37eee2"
"5b83ef4750bc04025aeb0a929b9ed5e228242a866a7b5cfa3c0a9f2681553026"
"476976f9a31d72752b58a41ad4553bd007504dfa7247688140e130774d2d5952"
"48923396f571b2f7623d75dfa2901d18156e075f2fa176bb41dbeb2806600057"
"0f6f683e26c1afbe9b6f2d0e9928197d898665d318e21ab311e4fba035f65ed1"
"509ee505e0aa40a35e343ab5889113b03bfc2e5c4b6fefbe0445904e4c8a3cab"
"4379d45f24cefd7e05200a3e89c3fe5bfe7b13f4ef19f4ea747074cf2376e2f7"
"9b291b78e8840ee79fca2fd8f86bc41bedbbf8bd912c34aeb9168530f72aa54e"
"9f8d1c3bf5393d9de93e07ee517744ce5c94fc417ba10b462c653fe09fc656c3"
"5001af6ab59517f344899be9c1298688931c89d8eb941687bf6e11039ef93033"
"61c5ff4bad025f9dd6492c0b9fc61ec2b08bd3cfeb600f7cfb722911b15068a6"
"ae8cbeebcda57cebf2d6fc330528ca5bd14e8b70fb0d662d76470adb7fff076d"
"f3367534f3afd0604fc4714f730b3c63a59f995bef2df005f656be887d6369ca"
"b1614d66763b10ef50a7f6e3c6f55bd381d7c23924ecd6d3453902f8fbfb7ca5"
"2f63e44e6a3cb6193ec495527566387caaf3bb217725033b94352d925f5e94d4"
"d5005c48dda0e26a36a5a77efceef3eb2f3e55a996870c177f4d4d26163f04ba"
"c9d54d60bb162b5e03000000"
)),
"PRAK-2020-01": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v7; published 2021-09-30 by Mefistotelis
# first use on 2020-01-08; used for:
# WM170 FW V00.04.1009-V01.01.0000,
# GL170 FW V01.01.0000,
# WM231 FW V01.00.0113-V09.09.0902,
# WM232 FW V02.04.1640
# WM260 FW V01.00.0600
"40000000c73fb7ba092e1fef4344b95a4ed80566b2a3aaaca69e3f7847a7e6d5"
"896cf3b9f64e771b6c44f32e3fab2e91ab5834e48bbf8e8ad38038e810ab3dd5"
"1f8b54f677eb5917e9df95fb0fd97445b2c40beedbb4256ac5a381c8ae16a99f"
"bcfcb66cb2a350e0e137e7cd77d069bf2c7567a2e292bdda3071376b4695a77e"
"4e6910b15f7a11edf48c1b4a3122f7ac623574864e292f0c16403d30322dfe32"
"7cef7c35b0c76a4947c50f67a7ad4b4afc64a02eada67325d6d278eb3ab6b7a3"
"3caea718f66b730d3f263b9395884910fe3567f7a0e149673634f49b6abea872"
"7fad4066a548a836f431326ec8cc1e682d697cc958cf4872be3343007c31d9e4"
"a3878d6cfa3987c96ce786073abcca064f5c6657ffd5701b5d0748f5b6c1863e"
"b620ad7ded26509e4e23cd9afac0e049f3ad2a066dd9bbf0293bb22e2859964f"
"292ce6ba206628aa50a0bc7422541540b7efb9433c94c865b322f8a7aebe91e5"
"d212da29e4f434a35173b0999a7f792cce3e7ef7c51274b8776ef1a743b77983"
"aeee0b3701814b8ee640e7ec18fa9c15a3bb59de1086517bec5c4f8940b1001e"
"b4dccdefc113d4db345c7c2e129c867794cb9c32a06255dfb8be68763b0a0940"
"71df74e113d24e749a4008b6372fc5c87fcd781319a71f6ac60f5fa5dc2b2ce9"
"71318b45ac83ee882a0dbf22d09ab1da28bc5e828a0080f35279dc3fb5a83d16"
"5a981f8574e41e2d01000100"
)),
"PRAK-2019-09": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v5; published 2021-04-02 by Felix Domke
# first use on 2020-06-09; used for:
# WM161 FW V01.00.0000
"40000000a1f987bf9fd539732277b64b32f178d7a62106d20336f2888292ee28"
"3790524565232831d245919a3a88d92a754cafbb1b8ccaed67dec3a29e0f425b"
"28cda10838a170227343eec744f78f3b5d19e9823a08fe6ee539fa7c0538e498"
"5e5d7a281f6854a2f511541649f190defcc3c7cf614a45c798076306c0f5ae34"
"d9f54da1adfc8d1585e47d4ba363b8289e48c8337fc4e9e1749d84a86ca5139b"
"552a89657a4844d2b8c497989608746a95252479dd468298671e6c42dfbf5828"
"bde4f669b9553ee86e5189df3f3bc86ef7277bffc71cb824fd705e86296a671f"
"959ed1add22a1ad22818fdfbf3cc4ffc1547f29da481c9472805896456aeac5f"
"eaf6113e34ec07b8a297b1278aaf546a24ecc42479b6284eebc7b6450bc0c979"
"b0ed4a5d13dd035a4464125c838a8f0b34c53978dbc4e7280b6bc41d5f4f3d86"
"8f585fc161113460de573421469fdfd112e1890dd2aae587c3204022f2fbeda4"
"1dc324a125ae15adc5c14ff2c39d98e7e3b114d4c75474437732dde3cbdb7b02"
"20320a9fd46e2284d2dadf2b53b10cf1644bb470cdab38863601e80566960679"
"a4c4402454b3d7d97f6ee15bf7caea26f36888150485d38e598e21ac2e164e1b"
"5d27e62d254ffa520e6cc0ff61a7ac756f597a82474881578ffa47b8ce579d22"
"ce0b43a199f27a59f8a80b7cb9c0f9c3cf168f9095b5f5d862f2e174e30ed61e"
"4992e6594045d58001000100"
)),
"PRAK-2017-12": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v3; published 2021-09-30 by Mefistotelis
# first use on 2017-12-14; used for:
# RC230 FW V01.00.0000,
# RC240 FW V01.00.0640,
# WM240 FW V00.06.0000-V01.00.0670 inside m090?,
# WM245 FW V01.01.0000-V01.01.0800 inside m090?,
# WM246 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0800 inside m090?,
"40000000c3151641157d30448fee8958d684332e8b28213cdb05c923e06afe2d"
"13371b4887c2872f7fd674490e250017183a9fcfb4109fddd86a555fc874b08d"
"6419c4b7fa7e03b8f106a08f571e8c26a532fc23e1dd0d7fe4d496523b08bc50"
"d9238a6baab57d37a13f3afd91284c8b98e2b45ecb87bdcbe691d8764f907729"
"0b236c0d8df4b2eb3ba2f36671967aeefb4ec263c9e4d75006d97f60a5eb8848"
"4b42707d0a28b9a116526acf8bc98e7e97aaa09aa5e2c8b6aaab7a2c21283c73"
"d668ecd7f024b8ebbaf278a587b6a064525d0703c5b62e8df7b6565913cb87ff"
"b96ee578d8a5329c93831cc1857104a4f2ba9d5b0055a50305c46f469ad4641a"
"1fa98f9492bdfd94e094cbfcd95ab04bd7f3400010deed20cfcd361ddb2f5fda"
"87ada7285afb9cd7521953dadb73b288edfb00ecdd769e78d2ca4294646590c1"
"8d5954b846d00bfd682e30f970e10d1fe960e724023a05474ea68cd9738d582f"
"cb3918563ac85ba6417964fffaf1710a3d2f5d870b5024764812c2ab6ff24cf8"
"0ee6d220c716a337a4bcd9c904e17b5e9f226ef6994a350635ee8c7a6f13d820"
"f9b87c1ef8ba206e7856e17e1d9a7ed6b7b23c7c14009d9622a775de575fdc1d"
"d19e57df90c65c81a80cb05fa7318080a61dff9b0d852267d6e8c6fd531e2787"
"bab7ff29818a38f2e6c2b41698f11c3b2a0c4ac66a966a42ce3bce7c8d5f1ecc"
"9543ff55f309df3b01000100"
)),
"PRAK-2017-08": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v2; published 2021-04-02 by Mefistotelis
# first use on 2017-08-24; used for:
# WM230 FW V00.02.0032-V01.00.0620,
# WM240 FW V00.06.0000-V01.00.0670 m0801,
# WM245 FW V01.01.0000-V01.01.0800 m0801,
# WM246 FW V01.00.0000-V01.01.0800 m0801,
# WM150 FW V01.00.0100,
# GL150 V01.00.0100-V01.00.0600,
# LT150 V01.00.0600
"40000000dbe15b5badcde418e2dbd9e253d2b9aded7f187824b5677f0ee6a6c3"
"fcd2ea329421a5b0252c63af6df81ac0c6416ec926e2558f4f4460a4b3af3ecb"
"7fd4db4741c3602b900c495acff5f8651da895f4a60030b3be640f8382222793"
"a17c510a34a25f7ddb371a45f6bfce5b74e1d1fc63213e13190b515cde9066de"
"4253ced7bf8ff9d10bf63235d8717eda922e17e60cc61d652a05d84f0c04e61b"
"8b2098275c1bc4a571b7fc957dd6da62696b64ac0c2060566df583df5838bd4a"
"bb1acc762f53f23efbda511e38d47e212e875bbddc183b479d0322cb9d604399"
"f88c72a95365af728e783d1721750d8774b1752d65be4d2c4d2aa4c1e94f10c2"
"98890cf780c322c93a57b3e94512de8fdb48e0c0eeeb1bb0f2aa47a322471f19"
"41f1ba93daceac32d28134e7697c9913db1dbb9c021f7a72d6f361c235cca6d8"
"e6551300256958bc1ae469d6560acdcbf396b2a3de5b9c9c3098650795274119"
"23dc5eaa4e07882bf44deb8148cf0166999fae7d3dbb44a48e7d60405f8fc5c8"
"a16ffc979007dcbf6a8438b3e91d57602bffe994138bb34c8a0363fcb873556f"
"bbd17ffda86650c7dc4d7dc567a3c97ac1c3bdd6e803761352e2722e0da477c0"
"41782ef66cec1d8277ee0bc8e868b8a243b1ddee4409880d7e02ede5f1247d52"
"1820917aba93369e96f326c65fba2370ffc9db17aa3aefa062cc45e93e81d9cb"
"36748cd95224988901000100"
)),
"PRAK-2017-01": bytes.fromhex(( # Provisioning RSA Auth Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
# first use on 2017-04-22; used for:
# WM335 FW V01.00.1000-V01.00.5200,
# WM220 FW V01.04.0000-V01.04.0500,
# PM420 FW V01.01.0450-V01.01.0590,
# WM100 FW V01.00.0000-V01.00.1000,
# WM620 FW V01.00.0000-V01.02.0500,
"40000000c3151641157d30448fee8958d684332e8b28213cdb05c923e06afe2d"
"13371b4887c2872f7fd674490e250017183a9fcfb4109fddd86a555fc874b08d"
"6419c4b7fa7e03b8f106a08f571e8c26a532fc23e1dd0d7fe4d496523b08bc50"
"d9238a6baab57d37a13f3afd91284c8b98e2b45ecb87bdcbe691d8764f907729"
"0b236c0d8df4b2eb3ba2f36671967aeefb4ec263c9e4d75006d97f60a5eb8848"
"4b42707d0a28b9a116526acf8bc98e7e97aaa09aa5e2c8b6aaab7a2c21283c73"
"d668ecd7f024b8ebbaf278a587b6a064525d0703c5b62e8df7b6565913cb87ff"
"b96ee578d8a5329c93831cc1857104a4f2ba9d5b0055a50305c46f469ad4641a"
"1fa98f9492bdfd94e094cbfcd95ab04bd7f3400010deed20cfcd361ddb2f5fda"
"87ada7285afb9cd7521953dadb73b288edfb00ecdd769e78d2ca4294646590c1"
"8d5954b846d00bfd682e30f970e10d1fe960e724023a05474ea68cd9738d582f"
"cb3918563ac85ba6417964fffaf1710a3d2f5d870b5024764812c2ab6ff24cf8"
"0ee6d220c716a337a4bcd9c904e17b5e9f226ef6994a350635ee8c7a6f13d820"
"f9b87c1ef8ba206e7856e17e1d9a7ed6b7b23c7c14009d9622a775de575fdc1d"
"d19e57df90c65c81a80cb05fa7318080a61dff9b0d852267d6e8c6fd531e2787"
"bab7ff29818a38f2e6c2b41698f11c3b2a0c4ac66a966a42ce3bce7c8d5f1ecc"
"9543ff55f309df3b01000100"
)),
"RRAK": bytes.fromhex(( # R RSA Auth Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
"400000000f636a5011d4a936eb0347a6c5bfde3664f79bb8a59850da53b411ba"
"244cdb21d23db498f560acdeb8143bed386b52f78aa7b5f384da5cf233ad2ae4"
"6ba4c9f2ba5b348ea1b9b93e380e6e03c627be7ea5e11e5b257d15437a15d41e"
"c39a74fbab06412b8f87991d4f168d8f292c253a3e5c97304d625be35dfd8a14"
"79e7dea40b46e4c370df365a25ea159c7190d989c990abb86691c814eed2d45c"
"d9ed2f4e69383ab7a054ccde6a7845bcd7a386b1cf3d8cdbf7ce86989b30b11f"
"2d382435528cc7d3e5293e2afeacd910bc593b3aab2baabf87808b81c934f877"
"08557e3710e2674013d5eb590c83f4628580d27114d1b61c5e6e6a335389d456"
"e247f4b81a8658d0a5dcf23ac8bd867a1f25297154abf06ce9954b4db5bfc063"
"0473d985f5059cd909516ad6897739f3611fece7a6c2ddce9c8f418614ff2c64"
"1143e6e238ae15e953b081d31a35b985521d3e9651d7b3722dccfb0478dcda36"
"93a7b8be0d69757591415188c12a1dd99c53c71afa752594b5edb3c5cc64bd6f"
"4daf681afe17d4c1c48c82ef5b1c7106972503e9def3fe93f2df77bec5b580a6"
"19ff16b53609c3e0fc74719db7604d3d5766b14a08be33543c86e219dd09832e"
"ebeb4b8a13f78fe34a1c51222935cc4bcf05717a36621b432174c70977f7188a"
"cb2e373dcdffcc719019fd148ef263fc2172d1002b800cc5c2395224ef23baf4"
"4ad51bd6474071ab01000100"
)),
"GFAK": bytes.fromhex(( # Geofence Auth Key v1; published 2017-06-27 by Freek van Tienen
"400000009b57a8886dc93e041e14808e38d810376d976948e8784b4ac0464881"
"fcc3ab99c61275391ec963ebd58e3d6a4ec460fc1ae1db270d9cf870fc879e63"
"3b7199e6a2f4872efafc1df27374b30219353f21d8972e75feb5040a50b2482f"
"256591df63c6aa56a63306b296ce118fb43a2e1592a35a4579044913a47fa1c6"
"843ffa057fb41b7d09e4a95d218abc39c66ce2968625e8a84265fef951bab8aa"
"23b2859fdffc26426ace8dc93fdd4c6384f5687440dd3bc8c7189ed6d463a9b5"
"468f4d70d54dfd76e680adc8ff84c394416e7d1f3a2378f993efc48a29995acd"
"1758300674a270c30ceacc1df68a3f52ca6712e8eabacf44f10519b9e3203190"
"c4e8e8a9bf87f1c9492838f0e7a42c665173144d03d475f1d94794937bb2da80"
"97b6ced0f9d370aa578aa92c297a19cd5a0854e97cf5a9d35f6645819a160718"
"f6c20702d35d4240ae9b0d2484065973890eddb4a8b4be19a8cdd7cc52557107"
"a65d2fc1bfe3c87a165d68ad2f5901390141c0fbf1aef7b2a89edd7507579b64"
"8387b94ebae2f15c96fe1e5ecff8cc85ce73a6f67cd7260bc7389807ecbaedba"
"0593168a03eebb4805fcc2b5b72b16e3fd8e9762fc7be10b7485d98d0986a813"
"d777fea808246d7e1a2a598717ddddc251013d68785e308e36d462139fd3a06a"
"d0c7493b1a1a9582ded7965588fd395556ea9113a8147c47edafe45a30a8b7da"
"ce0ded9e4732938001000100"
)),
"SLAK": # Slack community Auth Key; generated 2018-01-19 by Jan Dumon
"""-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----""",
}
def eprint(*args, **kwargs):
print(*args, file=sys.stderr, **kwargs)
class PlainCopyCipher:
def encrypt(self, plaintext):
return plaintext
def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
return ciphertext
class ImgPkgHeader(LittleEndianStructure):
_pack_ = 1
_fields_ = [('magic', c_char * 4), #0 'IM*H'
('header_version', c_uint), #4
('size', c_uint), #8
('reserved', c_ubyte * 4), #12
('header_size', c_uint), #16 Length of this header and following chunk headers
('signature_size', c_uint), #20 Length of RSA signature located after chunk headers
('payload_size', c_uint), #24 Length of the area after signature which contains data of all chunks
('target_size', c_uint), #28
('os', c_ubyte), #32
('arch', c_ubyte), #33
('compression', c_ubyte), #34
('anti_version', c_ubyte), #35
('auth_alg', c_uint), #36
('auth_key', c_char * 4), #40 Auth key identifier
('enc_key', c_char * 4), #44 Encryption key identifier
('scram_key', c_ubyte * 16), #48 Encrypted Scramble key; used in versions > 0
('name', c_char * 32), #64 Target Module name
('type', c_char * 4), #96 Target Module type identifier; used in versions > 1
('version', c_uint), #100
('date', c_uint), #104
('encr_cksum', c_uint), #108 Checksum of encrypted data; used in versions > 1
('reserved2', c_ubyte * 16), #112
('userdata', c_char * 16), #128
('entry', c_ubyte * 8), #144
('plain_cksum', c_uint), #152 Checksum of decrypted (plaintext) data; used in versions > 1
('chunk_num', c_uint), #156 Amount of chunks
('payload_digest', c_ubyte * 32), #160 SHA256 of the payload
] #192 is the end; chunk headers start after that
def get_format_version(self):
if self.magic != bytes("IM*H", "utf-8"):
return 0
if self.header_version == 0x0000:
return 2016
elif self.header_version == 0x0001:
return 2017
elif self.header_version == 0x0002:
return 2018
else:
return 0
def set_format_version(self, ver):
if ver == 2016:
self.magic = bytes("IM*H", "utf-8")
self.header_version = 0x0000
elif ver == 2017:
self.magic = bytes("IM*H", "utf-8")
self.header_version = 0x0001
elif ver == 2018:
self.magic = bytes("IM*H", "utf-8")
self.header_version = 0x0002
else:
raise ValueError("Unsupported image format version.")
def update_payload_size(self, payload_size):
self.payload_size = payload_size
self.target_size = self.header_size + self.signature_size + self.payload_size
self.size = self.target_size
def dict_export(self):
d = OrderedDict()
for (varkey, vartype) in self._fields_:
if varkey.startswith('unk'):
continue
v = getattr(self, varkey)
if isinstance(v, Array) and v._type_ == c_ubyte:
d[varkey] = bytes(v)
else:
d[varkey] = v
varkey = 'name'
d[varkey] = d[varkey].decode("utf-8")
varkey = 'auth_key'
d[varkey] = d[varkey].decode("utf-8")
varkey = 'enc_key'
d[varkey] = d[varkey].decode("utf-8")
varkey = 'type'
d[varkey] = d[varkey].decode("utf-8")
return d
def ini_export(self, fp):
d = self.dict_export()
fp.write("# DJI Firmware Signer main header file.\n")
fp.write(strftime("# Generated on %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\n", gmtime()))
varkey = 'name'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'pkg_format'
fp.write("{:s}={:d}\n".format(varkey,self.get_format_version()))
varkey = 'version'
fp.write("{:s}={:02d}.{:02d}.{:02d}.{:02d}\n".format(varkey, (d[varkey]>>24)&255, (d[varkey]>>16)&255, (d[varkey]>>8)&255, (d[varkey])&255))
varkey = 'anti_version'
fp.write("{:s}={:02d}.{:02d}.{:02d}.{:02d}\n".format(varkey, (d[varkey]>>24)&255, (d[varkey]>>16)&255, (d[varkey]>>8)&255, (d[varkey])&255))
varkey = 'date'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,strftime("%Y-%m-%d",strptime("{:x}".format(d[varkey]), '%Y%m%d'))))
varkey = 'enc_key'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'auth_alg'
fp.write("{:s}={:d}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'auth_key'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'os'
fp.write("{:s}={:d}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'arch'
fp.write("{:s}={:d}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'compression'
fp.write("{:s}={:d}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'type'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'userdata'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey].decode("utf-8"))) # not sure if string or binary
varkey = 'entry'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,''.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in d[varkey])))
#varkey = 'scram_key' # we will add the key later, as this one is encrypted
#fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,"".join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in d[varkey])))
def __repr__(self):
d = self.dict_export()
from pprint import pformat
return pformat(d, indent=0, width=160)
class ImgChunkHeader(LittleEndianStructure):
_pack_ = 1
_fields_ = [('id', c_char * 4), #0
('offset', c_uint), #4
('size', c_uint), #8
('attrib', c_uint), #12
('address', c_ulonglong), #16
('reserved', c_ubyte * 8), #24
] #32 is the end
def dict_export(self):
d = OrderedDict()
for (varkey, vartype) in self._fields_:
if varkey.startswith('unk'):
continue
v = getattr(self, varkey)
if isinstance(v, Array) and v._type_ == c_ubyte:
d[varkey] = bytes(v)
else:
d[varkey] = v
varkey = 'id'
d[varkey] = d[varkey].decode("utf-8")
return d
def ini_export(self, fp):
d = self.dict_export()
fp.write("# DJI Firmware Signer chunk header file.\n")
fp.write(strftime("# Generated on %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\n", gmtime()))
varkey = 'id'
fp.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'attrib'
fp.write("{:s}={:04X}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
#varkey = 'offset'
#fp.write("{:s}={:04X}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
varkey = 'address'
fp.write("{:s}={:08X}\n".format(varkey,d[varkey]))
def __repr__(self):
d = self.dict_export()
from pprint import pformat
return pformat(d, indent=0, width=160)
class ImgRSAPublicKey(LittleEndianStructure):
_pack_ = 1
_fields_ = [('len', c_int), # 0: Length of n[] in number of uint32_t
('n0inv', c_uint), # 4: -1 / n[0] mod 2^32
('n', c_uint * 64), # 8: modulus as little endian array
('rr', c_uint * 64), # 264: R^2 as little endian array
('exponent', c_int)] # 520: 3 or 65537
def raise_or_warn(po, ex):
""" Raise exception, unless force-continue parameter was used.
"""
if (po.force_continue):
eprint("{:s}: Warning: {:s} Continuing anyway.".format(po.sigfile,str(ex)))
else:
raise ex
def combine_int_array(int_arr, bits_per_entry):
""" Makes one big numer out of an array of numbers.
Allows to make pythonic big number out of little endian number stored in parts
as a list.
"""
ans = 0
for i, val in enumerate(int_arr):
ans += (val << i*bits_per_entry)
return ans
def get_key_data(po, pkghead, enc_k_fourcc):
""" Returns encryption/authentication key array for given FourCC.
Accepts both string and variants of bytes.
"""
if hasattr(enc_k_fourcc, 'decode'):
enc_k_str = enc_k_fourcc.decode("utf-8")
else:
enc_k_str = str(enc_k_fourcc)
enc_k_select = None
for kstr in po.key_select:
if enc_k_str == kstr[:4]:
enc_k_select = kstr
break
key_list = []
if enc_k_select is None:
if enc_k_str in keys:
enc_k_select = enc_k_str
else:
for kstr in keys:
if enc_k_str == kstr[:4]:
key_list.append(kstr)
if enc_k_select is not None:
# Key selection was already made
pass
elif len(key_list) == 1:
# There is only one key to choose from
enc_k_select = key_list[0]
elif len(key_list) > 1:
# We have multiple matching keys; we do not have enough information to auto-choose correct one
# (the key needs to be selected based of FW package version, we only have FW module version)
enc_k_select = key_list[0]
if (po.show_multiple_keys_warn):
eprint("{}: Warning: '{:s}' matches multiple keys; using first, '{:s}'".format(po.sigfile,enc_k_str,enc_k_select))
eprint("{}: Key choices: {:s}".format(po.sigfile,", ".join(key_list)))
po.show_multiple_keys_warn = False
if enc_k_select in keys.keys():
enc_key = keys[enc_k_select]
else:
enc_key = None
return enc_key
def imah_get_crypto_params(po, pkghead):
# Get the encryption key
enc_k_str = pkghead.enc_key.decode("utf-8")
enc_key = get_key_data(po, pkghead, enc_k_str)
if enc_key is None:
eprint("{}: Warning: Cannot find enc_key '{:s}'".format(po.sigfile,enc_k_str))
return (None, None, None)
# Prepare initial values for AES
if pkghead.header_version == 2:
if (po.verbose > 3):
print("Key encryption key:\n{:s}".format(' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in enc_key)))
crypt_mode = AES.MODE_CTR
cipher = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_ECB)
if (po.verbose > 3):
print("Encrypted Scramble key:\n{:s}".format(' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in pkghead.scram_key)))
crypt_key = cipher.decrypt(bytes(pkghead.scram_key))
# For CTR mode, 12 bytes of crypt_iv will be interpreted as nonce, and remaining 4 will be initial value of counter
crypt_iv = bytes([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])
elif pkghead.header_version == 1:
if (po.verbose > 3):
print("Key encryption key:\n{:s}".format(' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in enc_key)))
crypt_mode = AES.MODE_CBC
cipher = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_CBC, bytes([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]))
if (po.verbose > 3):
print("Encrypted Scramble key:\n{:s}".format(' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in pkghead.scram_key)))
crypt_key = cipher.decrypt(bytes(pkghead.scram_key))
crypt_iv = bytes([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])
else:
crypt_mode = AES.MODE_CBC
crypt_key = enc_key
crypt_iv = bytes(pkghead.scram_key)
return (crypt_key, crypt_mode, crypt_iv)
def imah_get_auth_params(po, pkghead):
# Get the key
auth_k_str = pkghead.auth_key.decode("utf-8")
auth_key_data = get_key_data(po, pkghead, auth_k_str)
if auth_key_data is None:
eprint("{}: Warning: Cannot find auth_key '{:s}'".format(po.sigfile,auth_k_str))
return (None)
if isinstance(auth_key_data, str):
auth_key = RSA.importKey(auth_key_data)
elif len(auth_key_data) == sizeof(ImgRSAPublicKey):
auth_key_struct = ImgRSAPublicKey()
memmove(addressof(auth_key_struct), auth_key_data, sizeof(auth_key_struct))
auth_key_n = combine_int_array(auth_key_struct.n, 32)
auth_key = RSA.construct( (auth_key_n, auth_key_struct.exponent, ) )
else:
eprint("{}: Warning: Unrecognized format of auth_key '{:s}'".format(po.sigfile,auth_k_str))
return (None)
return (auth_key)
def imah_compute_checksum(po, buf, start = 0):
cksum = start
for i in range(0, len(buf) // 4):
v = int.from_bytes(buf[i*4:i*4+4], byteorder='little')
cksum += v
# last dword
i = len(buf) // 4
if i*4 < len(buf):
last_buf = buf[i*4:i*4+4] + bytes(3 * [0])
v = int.from_bytes(last_buf[:4], byteorder='little')
cksum += v
return (cksum) & ((2 ** 32) - 1)
def imah_write_fwsig_head(po, pkghead, minames):
fname = "{:s}_head.ini".format(po.mdprefix)
fwheadfile = open(fname, "w")
pkghead.ini_export(fwheadfile)
# Prepare initial values for AES
if pkghead.header_version == 0: # Scramble key is used as initial vector
fwheadfile.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format('scramble_iv',' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in pkghead.scram_key)))
else:
crypt_key, _, _ = imah_get_crypto_params(po, pkghead)
if crypt_key is None: # Scramble key is used, but we cannot decrypt it
eprint("{}: Warning: Storing encrypted scramble key due to missing crypto config.".format(po.sigfile))
fwheadfile.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format('scramble_key_encrypted',' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in pkghead.scram_key)))
else: # Store the decrypted scrable key
fwheadfile.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format('scramble_key',' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in crypt_key)))
# Store list of modules/chunks to include
fwheadfile.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format('modules',' '.join(minames)))
fwheadfile.close()
def imah_read_fwsig_head(po):
pkghead = ImgPkgHeader()
fname = "{:s}_head.ini".format(po.mdprefix)
parser = configparser.ConfigParser()
with open(fname, "r") as lines:
lines = itertools.chain(("[asection]",), lines) # This line adds section header to ini
parser.read_file(lines)
# Set magic fields properly
pkgformat = int(parser.get("asection", "pkg_format"))
pkghead.set_format_version(pkgformat)
# Set the rest of the fields
pkghead.name = bytes(parser.get("asection", "name"), "utf-8")
pkghead.userdata = bytes(parser.get("asection", "userdata"), "utf-8")
# The only person at Dji who knew how to store dates must have been fired
date_val = strptime(parser.get("asection", "date"),"%Y-%m-%d")
pkghead.date = ((date_val.tm_year // 1000) << 28) | (((date_val.tm_year % 1000) // 100) << 24) | \
(((date_val.tm_year % 100) // 10) << 20) | ((date_val.tm_year % 10) << 16) | \
((date_val.tm_mon // 10) << 12) | ((date_val.tm_mon % 10) << 8) | \
((date_val.tm_mday // 10) << 4) | (date_val.tm_mday % 10)
version_s = parser.get("asection", "version")
version_m = re.search('(?P<major>[0-9]+)[.](?P<minor>[0-9]+)[.](?P<build>[0-9]+)[.](?P<rev>[0-9]+)', version_s)
pkghead.version = ((int(version_m.group("major"),10)&0xff)<<24) + ((int(version_m.group("minor"),10)&0xff)<<16) + \
((int(version_m.group("build"),10)&0xff)<<8) + ((int(version_m.group("rev"),10)&0xff))
anti_version_s = parser.get("asection", "anti_version")
anti_version_m = re.search('(?P<major>[0-9]+)[.](?P<minor>[0-9]+)[.](?P<build>[0-9]+)[.](?P<rev>[0-9]+)', anti_version_s)
pkghead.anti_version = ((int(anti_version_m.group("major"),10)&0xff)<<24) + ((int(anti_version_m.group("minor"),10)&0xff)<<16) + \
((int(anti_version_m.group("build"),10)&0xff)<<8) + ((int(anti_version_m.group("rev"),10)&0xff))
pkghead.enc_key = bytes(parser.get("asection", "enc_key"), "utf-8")
pkghead.auth_key = bytes(parser.get("asection", "auth_key"), "utf-8")
pkghead.auth_alg = int(parser.get("asection", "auth_alg"))
pkghead.os = int(parser.get("asection", "os"))
pkghead.arch = int(parser.get("asection", "arch"))
pkghead.compression = int(parser.get("asection", "compression"))
pkghead.type = bytes(parser.get("asection", "type"), "utf-8")
entry_bt = bytes.fromhex(parser.get("asection", "entry"))
pkghead.entry = (c_ubyte * len(entry_bt)).from_buffer_copy(entry_bt)
if po.random_scramble:
scramble_needs_encrypt = (pkghead.header_version != 0)
scramble_key = os.urandom(16)
pkghead.scram_key = (c_ubyte * len(scramble_key)).from_buffer_copy(scramble_key)
elif pkghead.header_version == 0: # Scramble key is used as initial vector
scramble_needs_encrypt = False
scramble_iv = bytes.fromhex(parser.get("asection", "scramble_iv"))
pkghead.scram_key = (c_ubyte * len(scramble_iv)).from_buffer_copy(scramble_iv)
else: # Scrable key should be encrypted
if parser.has_option("asection", "scramble_key"):
scramble_needs_encrypt = True
scramble_key = bytes.fromhex(parser.get("asection", "scramble_key"))
else: # Maybe we have pre-encrypted version?
scramble_needs_encrypt = False
scramble_key = bytes.fromhex(parser.get("asection", "scramble_key_encrypted"))
if scramble_key is not None:
pkghead.scram_key = (c_ubyte * len(scramble_key)).from_buffer_copy(scramble_key)
else:
eprint("{}: Warning: Scramble key not found in header and not set to ramdom; zeros will be used.".format(po.sigfile))
minames_s = parser.get("asection", "modules")
minames = minames_s.split(' ')
pkghead.chunk_num = len(minames)
pkghead.header_size = sizeof(pkghead) + sizeof(ImgChunkHeader)*pkghead.chunk_num
pkghead.signature_size = 256
pkghead.update_payload_size(0)
del parser
if scramble_needs_encrypt:
# Get the encryption key
enc_k_str = pkghead.enc_key.decode("utf-8")
enc_key = get_key_data(po, pkghead, enc_k_str)
if enc_key is None:
eprint("{}: Warning: Cannot find enc_key '{:s}'; scramble key left unencrypted.".format(fwsigfile.name,enc_k_str))
else:
cipher = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_CBC, bytes([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]))
crypt_key_enc = cipher.encrypt(bytes(pkghead.scram_key))
pkghead.scram_key = (c_ubyte * 16)(*list(crypt_key_enc))
return (pkghead, minames, pkgformat)
def imah_write_fwentry_head(po, i, e, miname, can_decrypt):
fname = "{:s}_{:s}.ini".format(po.mdprefix,miname)
fwheadfile = open(fname, "w")
e.ini_export(fwheadfile)
if not can_decrypt: # If we're exporting without decryption, we must retain decrypted size
fwheadfile.write("{:s}={:s}\n".format('size',"{:d}".format(e.size)))
fwheadfile.close()
def imah_read_fwentry_head(po, i, miname):
chunk = ImgChunkHeader()
fname = "{:s}_{:s}.ini".format(po.mdprefix,miname)
parser = configparser.ConfigParser()
with open(fname, "r") as lines:
lines = itertools.chain(("[asection]",), lines) # This line adds section header to ini
parser.read_file(lines)
id_s = parser.get("asection", 'id')
chunk.id = bytes(id_s, "utf-8")
attrib_s = parser.get("asection", 'attrib')
chunk.attrib = int(attrib_s, 16)
size_s = parser.get("asection", 'size',fallback="0")
chunk.size = int(size_s,0)
#offset_s = parser.get("asection", 'offset')
#chunk.offset = int(offset_s, 16)
address_s = parser.get("asection", 'address')
chunk.address = int(address_s, 16)
del parser
return (chunk)
def imah_unsign(po, fwsigfile):
# Decode the image header
pkghead = ImgPkgHeader()
if fwsigfile.readinto(pkghead) != sizeof(pkghead):
raise EOFError("Could not read signed image file header.")
# Check the magic
pkgformat = pkghead.get_format_version()
if pkgformat == 0:
raise_or_warn(po, ValueError("Unexpected magic value in main header; input file is not a signed image."))
if pkghead.size != pkghead.target_size:
eprint("{}: Warning: Header field 'size' is different that 'target_size'; the tool is not designed to handle this.".format(fwsigfile.name))
if not all(v == 0 for v in pkghead.reserved):
eprint("{}: Warning: Header field 'reserved' is non-zero; the tool is not designed to handle this.".format(fwsigfile.name))
if not all(v == 0 for v in pkghead.reserved2):
eprint("{}: Warning: Header field 'reserved2' is non-zero; the tool is not designed to handle this.".format(fwsigfile.name))
if pkgformat < 2018:
if pkghead.encr_cksum != 0:
eprint("{}: Warning: Header field 'encr_cksum' is non-zero; this is only allowed in newer formats.".format(fwsigfile.name))
if pkghead.plain_cksum != 0:
eprint("{}: Warning: Header field 'plain_cksum' is non-zero; this is only allowed in newer formats.".format(fwsigfile.name))
if (po.verbose > 0):
print("{}: Unpacking image...".format(fwsigfile.name))
if (po.verbose > 1):
print(pkghead)
# Read chunk headers of the image
chunks = []
for i in range(0, pkghead.chunk_num):
chunk = ImgChunkHeader()
if fwsigfile.readinto(chunk) != sizeof(chunk):
raise EOFError("Could not read signed image chunk {:d} header.".format(i))
chunks.append(chunk)
# Compute header hash and checksum; for checksum, we need a header without checksum stored
pkghead_nosum = copy(pkghead)
pkghead_nosum.encr_cksum = 0
checksum_enc = imah_compute_checksum(po, bytes(pkghead_nosum))
header_digest = SHA256.new()
header_digest.update(bytes(pkghead))
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
header_digest.update(bytes(chunk))
checksum_enc = imah_compute_checksum(po, bytes(chunk), checksum_enc)
if (po.verbose > 2):
print("Computed header checksum 0x{:08X} and digest:\n{:s}".format(checksum_enc, ' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in header_digest.digest())))
if pkghead.signature_size != 256: # 2048 bit key length
raise_or_warn(po, ValueError("Signed image file head signature has unexpected size."))
head_signature = fwsigfile.read(pkghead.signature_size)
if len(head_signature) != pkghead.signature_size:
raise EOFError("Could not read signature of signed image file head.")
auth_key = imah_get_auth_params(po, pkghead)
try:
if pkgformat >= 2018:
mgf = lambda x, y: pss.MGF1(x, y, SHA256)
salt_bytes = header_digest.digest_size
header_signer = pss.new(auth_key, mask_func=mgf, salt_bytes=salt_bytes)
# The PSS signer does not return value, just throws exception of a fail
header_signer.verify(header_digest, head_signature)
signature_match = True
else:
header_signer = PKCS1_v1_5.new(auth_key)
signature_match = header_signer.verify(header_digest, head_signature)
except Exception as ex:
print("{}: Warning: Image file head signature verification caused cryptographic exception: {}".format(fwsigfile.name,str(ex)))
signature_match = False
if signature_match:
if (po.verbose > 1):
print("{}: Image file head signature verification passed.".format(fwsigfile.name))
else:
raise_or_warn(po, ValueError("Image file head signature verification failed."))
# Finish computing encrypted data checksum; cannot do that during decryption as we would
# likely miss some padding, which is also included in the checksum
remain_enc_n = pkghead.payload_size
while remain_enc_n > 0:
copy_buffer = fwsigfile.read(min(1024 * 1024, remain_enc_n))
checksum_enc = imah_compute_checksum(po, copy_buffer, checksum_enc)
remain_enc_n -= 1024 * 1024
checksum_enc = (2 ** 32) - checksum_enc
if pkgformat < 2018:
pass # No checksums are used in these formats
elif pkghead.encr_cksum == checksum_enc:
if (po.verbose > 1):
print("{}: Encrypted data checksum 0x{:08X} matches.".format(fwsigfile.name, checksum_enc))
else:
if (po.verbose > 1):
print("{}: Encrypted data checksum 0x{:08X}, expected 0x{:08X}.".format(fwsigfile.name, checksum_enc, pkghead.encr_cksum))
raise_or_warn(po, ValueError("Encrypted data checksum verification failed."))
# Prepare array of names; "0" will mean empty index
minames = ["0"]*len(chunks)
# Name the modules after target component
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
if chunk.size > 0:
d = chunk.dict_export()
minames[i] = "{:s}".format(d['id'])
# Rename targets in case of duplicates
minames_seen = set()
for i in range(len(minames)):
miname = minames[i]
if miname in minames_seen:
# Add suffix a..z to multiple uses of the same module
for miname_suffix in range(97,110):
if miname+chr(miname_suffix) not in minames_seen:
break
# Show warning the first time duplicate is found
if (miname_suffix == 97):
eprint("{}: Warning: Found multiple chunks '{:s}'; invalid signed image.".format(fwsigfile.name,miname))
minames[i] = miname+chr(miname_suffix)
minames_seen.add(minames[i])
minames_seen = None
imah_write_fwsig_head(po, pkghead, minames)
crypt_key, crypt_mode, crypt_iv = imah_get_crypto_params(po, pkghead)
if (crypt_key is not None) and (po.verbose > 2):
print("Scramble key:\n{:s}".format(' '.join("{:02X}".format(x) for x in crypt_key)))
# Output the chunks
checksum_dec = 0
num_skipped = 0
single_cipher = None # IMaH v1 creates a new cipher for each chunk, IMaH v2 reuses a single cipher
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
chunk_fname= "{:s}_{:s}.bin".format(po.mdprefix,minames[i])
if (chunk.attrib & 0x01) or (pkghead.enc_key == b''): # Not encrypted chunk
cipher = PlainCopyCipher()
pad_cnt = 0
if (po.verbose > 0):
print("{}: Unpacking plaintext chunk '{:s}'...".format(fwsigfile.name,minames[i]))
can_decrypt = True
elif crypt_key is not None: # Encrypted chunk (have key as well)
if crypt_mode == AES.MODE_CTR:
if single_cipher is None:
init_cf = int.from_bytes(crypt_iv[12:16], byteorder='big')
countf = Counter.new(32, crypt_iv[:12], initial_value=init_cf)
cipher = AES.new(crypt_key, crypt_mode, counter=countf)
single_cipher = cipher
else:
cipher = single_cipher
dji_block_size = 32
else:
cipher = AES.new(crypt_key, crypt_mode, iv=crypt_iv)
# the data is really padded to 32, but we do not care as we reset state for every chunk
dji_block_size = AES.block_size
pad_cnt = (dji_block_size - chunk.size % dji_block_size) % dji_block_size
if (po.verbose > 0):
print("{}: Unpacking encrypted chunk '{:s}'...".format(fwsigfile.name,minames[i]))
can_decrypt = True
else: # Missing encryption key
eprint("{}: Warning: Cannot decrypt chunk '{:s}'; crypto config missing.".format(fwsigfile.name,minames[i]))
if (not po.force_continue):
num_skipped += 1
continue
if (po.verbose > 0):
print("{}: Copying still encrypted chunk '{:s}'...".format(fwsigfile.name,minames[i]))
cipher = PlainCopyCipher()