|
gboolean ostree_sign_ed25519_data_verify (OstreeSign *self, |
|
GBytes *data, |
|
GVariant *signatures, |
|
char **out_success_message, |
|
GError **error) |
|
{ |
|
g_return_val_if_fail (OSTREE_IS_SIGN (self), FALSE); |
|
g_return_val_if_fail (data != NULL, FALSE); |
|
|
|
OstreeSignEd25519 *sign = _ostree_sign_ed25519_get_instance_private(OSTREE_SIGN_ED25519(self)); |
|
|
|
if (!_ostree_sign_ed25519_is_initialized (sign, error)) |
|
return FALSE; |
|
|
|
if (signatures == NULL) |
|
return glnx_throw (error, "ed25519: commit have no signatures of my type"); |
|
|
|
if (!g_variant_is_of_type (signatures, (GVariantType *) OSTREE_SIGN_METADATA_ED25519_TYPE)) |
|
return glnx_throw (error, "ed25519: wrong type passed for verification"); |
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBSODIUM |
|
/* If no keys pre-loaded then, |
|
* try to load public keys from storage(s) */ |
|
if (sign->public_keys == NULL) |
|
{ |
|
g_autoptr (GVariantBuilder) builder = NULL; |
|
g_autoptr (GVariant) options = NULL; |
|
|
|
builder = g_variant_builder_new (G_VARIANT_TYPE ("a{sv}")); |
|
options = g_variant_builder_end (builder); |
|
|
|
if (!ostree_sign_ed25519_load_pk (self, options, error)) |
|
return FALSE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
g_debug ("verify: data hash = 0x%x", g_bytes_hash(data)); |
|
|
|
g_autoptr(GString) invalid_signatures = NULL; |
|
guint n_invalid_signatures = 0; |
|
|
|
for (gsize i = 0; i < g_variant_n_children(signatures); i++) |
|
{ |
|
g_autoptr (GVariant) child = g_variant_get_child_value (signatures, i); |
|
g_autoptr (GBytes) signature = g_variant_get_data_as_bytes(child); |
|
|
|
g_autofree char * hex = g_malloc0 (crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES*2 + 1); |
|
|
|
g_debug("Read signature %d: %s", (gint)i, g_variant_print(child, TRUE)); |
|
|
|
for (GList *public_key = sign->public_keys; |
|
public_key != NULL; |
|
public_key = public_key->next) |
|
{ |
|
|
|
/* TODO: use non-list for tons of revoked keys? */ |
|
if (g_list_find_custom (sign->revoked_keys, public_key->data, _compare_ed25519_keys) != NULL) |
|
{ |
|
g_debug("Skip revoked key '%s'", |
|
sodium_bin2hex (hex, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES*2+1, public_key->data, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES)); |
|
continue; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (crypto_sign_verify_detached ((guchar *) g_variant_get_data (child), |
|
g_bytes_get_data (data, NULL), |
|
g_bytes_get_size (data), |
|
public_key->data) != 0) |
|
{ |
|
/* Incorrect signature! */ |
|
if (invalid_signatures == NULL) |
|
invalid_signatures = g_string_new (""); |
|
else |
|
g_string_append (invalid_signatures, "; "); |
|
n_invalid_signatures++; |
|
g_string_append_printf (invalid_signatures, "key '%s'", |
|
sodium_bin2hex (hex, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES*2+1, public_key->data, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES)); |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
if (out_success_message) |
|
{ |
|
*out_success_message = |
|
g_strdup_printf ("ed25519: Signature verified successfully with key '%s'", |
|
sodium_bin2hex (hex, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES*2+1, public_key->data, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES)); |
|
} |
|
return TRUE; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (invalid_signatures) |
|
{ |
|
g_assert_cmpuint (n_invalid_signatures, >, 0); |
|
/* The test suite has a key ring with 100 keys. This seems insane, let's |
|
* cap a reasonable error message at 3. |
|
*/ |
|
if (n_invalid_signatures > 3) |
|
return glnx_throw (error, "ed25519: Signature couldn't be verified; tried %u keys", n_invalid_signatures); |
|
return glnx_throw (error, "ed25519: Signature couldn't be verified with: %s", invalid_signatures->str); |
|
} |
|
return glnx_throw (error, "ed25519: no signatures found"); |
|
#endif /* HAVE_LIBSODIUM */ |
|
|
|
return FALSE; |
|
} |
DemiMarie Analyst
Impact
I (Demi Marie Obenour) have found what I believe are two security vulnerabilities in libostree. Both are low severity, and I believe the practical impact is denial of service only. Both vulnerabilities are in src/libostree/ostree-sign-ed25519.c:ostree_sign_ed25519_data_verify
(link:
ostree/src/libostree/ostree-sign-ed25519.c
Lines 167 to 270 in 490f515
The first is that the ed25519 signature verification code does not check that the signature is the correct length. As a result, if the signature is too short, libsodium will end up reading a few bytes out of bounds. Theoretically, this could cause an bad signature to be accepted. However, for this to happen, the out-of-bounds data would need to form a valid signature when combined with the actual data, which means that the file must have actually been signed. A more likely possibility is that libsodium winds up reading into an adjacent unmapped page and crashes.
The second is that if there are N keys in the keyring, M revoked keys, and O signatures, libostree will consume
O(N * M * O)(cubic) time checking for key revocation. This can be reduced toO(N * O + M log M + N)time or better by using an associative array to filter out revoked keys and by moving the revocation check out of the for-each-signature loop.Patches
83e6357
Workarounds
None.
Credits
This issue was reported by Demi Marie Obenour [email protected].