diff --git a/cheatsheets/Software_Supply_Chain_Security.md b/cheatsheets/Software_Supply_Chain_Security.md
index 9f34d62bc8..c3e3fadf6f 100644
--- a/cheatsheets/Software_Supply_Chain_Security.md
+++ b/cheatsheets/Software_Supply_Chain_Security.md
@@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ From a the perspective of software consumers, only accepting components which ha
 
 Using a private artifact repository increases the control an organization has over the various artifacts that are used within the SSC. Artifacts should be reviewed before being allowed in the private repository and organizations must ensure that usage of these repositories cannot be bypassed. Although usage of private repositories can introduce extra maintenance or reduce agility, they can also be an important component of SSCS, especially for sensitive or critical applications.
 
-#### Use Source Control for Build Scritps and Config
+#### Use Source Control for Build Scripts and Config
 
 The benefits of VCSs can be realized for items beyond source control; this is especially true for config and scripts related to CI/CD pipelines. Enforcing version control for these files allows one to incorporate reviews, merge rules, and like controls into the config update process. Using VCS also increase visibility, allowing one easy visibility into any changes introduced, whether malicious or benign [[2](#references)].
 
 #### Verify Provenance/Ensure Sufficient Metadata is Generated
 
-Having assurance that an SSC component comes from a trusted source and has not been tampered with is a important part of SSCS. Generation and consumption of provenance, defined in [SLSA 1.0](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance) as "the verifiable information about software artifacts describing where, when and how something was produced"cis an important part of this. The provenance should be generated by the build platform (as opposed to a local development system), be very difficult for attackers to forge, and contain all details necessary to accurately link the result back to the builder [[7](#references)]. SLSA 1.0 compliant provenance can be generated using builders such as [FRSCA](https://github.com/buildsec/frsca) or [Github Actions](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator) and verified [using SLSA Verifier](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier?tab=readme-ov-file)
+Having assurance that an SSC component comes from a trusted source and has not been tampered with is a important part of SSCS. Generation and consumption of provenance, defined in [SLSA 1.0](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance) as "the verifiable information about software artifacts describing where, when and how something was produced" is an important part of this. The provenance should be generated by the build platform (as opposed to a local development system), be very difficult for attackers to forge, and contain all details necessary to accurately link the result back to the builder [[7](#references)]. SLSA 1.0 compliant provenance can be generated using builders such as [FRSCA](https://github.com/buildsec/frsca) or [Github Actions](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator) and verified [using SLSA Verifier](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier?tab=readme-ov-file)
 
 #### Ephemeral, Isolated Builds
 
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ Once the build process has finished, one should not simply assume that the final
 
 #### Monitor Deployed Software for Vulnerabilities
 
-SSCS does not end with the deployment of the software; the deployed software must be monitored and maintained to reduce risk. New vulnerabilities, whether introduced due to an update or simply newly discovered (or made public), are a continual concern in software systems [[4](#references)]. When performing this monitoring, a wholistic approached must be used; code dependencies, container images, web servers, and operating system components are just a sampling of items that must be consider.To support this monitoring, an accurate and up-to-date inventory of system components is critical. Additionally, insecure configuration changes must be monitored and acted upon.
+SSCS does not end with the deployment of the software; the deployed software must be monitored and maintained to reduce risk. New vulnerabilities, whether introduced due to an update or simply newly discovered (or made public), are a continual concern in software systems [[4](#references)]. When performing this monitoring, a wholistic approached must be used; code dependencies, container images, web servers, and operating system components are just a sampling of items that must be consider. To support this monitoring, an accurate and up-to-date inventory of system components is critical. Additionally, insecure configuration changes must be monitored and acted upon.
 
 ## References