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Meltdown and Spectre: Variant 1 - bounds check bypass

Moderate
jbech-linaro published GHSA-w8ww-55c8-83vh Jun 28, 2021

Package

OP-TEE

Affected versions

All versions

Patched versions

None

Description

Since user data provided to Trusted Applications most often comes from non-secure side, it is important to check the code where we are using those non-secure parameters. The same type of checks are necessary when doing syscalls from Trusted Applications. In principle, this means that non-secure side eventually could access secure memory when untrusted value is passed to secure side.

Patches

We have been doing manual inspection of the OP-TEE code, and so far have not been able to identify any vulnerable areas. Code analysis tools and compiler updates to support finding areas potentially vulnerable are being discussed with members of Linaro.

Workarounds

N/A

References

All details about the attacks has been thoroughly described in the whitepapers that can found at the Meltdown and Spectre page. A blog post (Implications of Meltdown and Spectre : Part 1) is also available on the Linaro website.

OP-TEE ID

OP-TEE-2018-0001

Reported by

For more information

For more information regarding the security incident process in OP-TEE, please read the information that can be found when going to the "Security" page at https://www.trustedfirmware.org.

Severity

Moderate

CVE ID

CVE-2017-5753

Weaknesses

No CWEs